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INTRODUCTION
Based on a concept that was developed in the summer of 2002, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have operated in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for nearly six years.
2 Their efforts play a tremendous role in security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations and they continue to prove their value to commanders as effective units driving positive change for the future of both Iraq and
Afghanistan. PRTs were conceptually designed to achieve three fundamental objectives.
First, they are charged with the responsibility of improving security at the provincial governmental level through the training, support, and mentoring of host nation security forces. Second, they play a large role in extending the reach of local governments by strengthening their authority and influence. And lastly, through extensive interagency cooperation, they facilitate rebuilding and reconstruction within priority provinces.
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Considering the importance of the mission assigned, and the number of PRTs currently in place, it is readily apparent that the Joint Force Commander cannot deny that these teams are critical operational forces that have the potential to achieve many operational and even strategic objectives within the theater. Unfortunately, military commanders are tasked with carrying out this mission without doctrine and with guidance that is piecemeal and varied in scope and applicability.
After the Vietnam War, joint forces, and particularly the U.S. Army, failed to codify years of counterinsurgency experience. This failure ultimately resulted in the failure of U.S.
Joint Forces to recognize and adapt to the burgeoning insurgencies in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. Until the 2006 publication of the Army's FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual, there were significant deficits of synergy, organization, training and execution in combating these insurgencies. In the foreword of the FM 3-24, Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James Amos (USMC) state, "this manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap… it is essential that we give [Soldiers and Marines] a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations." 4 Through the publication of the FM 3-24 and the soon to be released Joint Publication 3-24, the U.S. military is finally correcting a mistake and in-turn making our fighting forces more effective. It is incumbent that U.S. forces do not repeat mistakes. It is time that joint doctrine is developed to enable PRTs with the codification of effective guidelines for training, planning, preparing, and executing the mission they have been assigned.
The PRT mission is distinctly unique to joint forces and interagency partners, requiring special skills, techniques, and procedures that are required to bridge together several aspects of a nation's functions to achieve established objectives. PRTs coordinate extensively with host nation political, military, and private sector leaders to improve governance, economic development, justice systems, and security institutions. The overarching focus of the PRT is to build and improve upon the infrastructure within provinces or districts they are assigned. Constructing schools, roads, clinics, etc. serves to empower the local populace while building credibility for the United States. These are the intangible results that PRTs are capable of producing. The ethereal tasks associated with effective nation-building are challenging and require resolute effort on the part of the military forces, numerous civilian agencies, and most importantly, the leaders of the host nation government.
The thesis of this paper is that there exists a compelling need for the promulgation of a single source of operational joint doctrine that can serve the multitude of civil and military entities involved with the operations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
METHODOLOGY
This paper addresses the extent current PRT operations are utilized and the mission they are tasked to perform. It also addresses the applicability of joint doctrine and how it pertains to the training, planning, preparing, and execution of their mission. Justification for doctrine is substantiated and shortfalls are identified in the current PRT mission to further highlight how doctrine can maximize the effectiveness of PRT operations. Various sources of best practices and lessons learned are also discussed that may be used as references for the development of doctrine. This paper concludes with recommendations aimed toward the development of dedicated joint doctrine for PRT operations. publication as well as the JP-3-57 "Civil-Military Operations" publication. These publications all provide extensive information related to their specific topic. The topics may be very specific in scope, or may cover a broad range of operational functions. In any case, each one of these doctrinal publications has had considerable time to mature, has evolved significantly over the past few years, and has been modified and rewritten numerous times.
DOCTRINE IS IMPORTANT
Unfortunately, authoritative, doctrinal principles on the employment of PRTs do not exist. The initial draft of the joint COIN publication includes an appendix that, over four pages, briefly highlights the PRT mission, fundamental guidelines, and command and control.
11 Similarly, the Civil-Military Operations (CMO) publication gives PRTs a brief, glossed over description and has a few inserts highlighting their establishment in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
12 Surprisingly, mention of PRTs in the JP 3-16 "Multi-National Operations" publication is more or less anecdotal but identifies organizations such as PRTs as providing unique "force-multiplier" capabilities to the overall Multi-National Task find that the information may exist in sources associated with host nation employment of PRTs, but nothing exists in U.S. joint doctrine.
PRT OPERATIONS JUSTIFY REQUIREMENT FOR JOINT DOCTRINE
The recent accomplishments of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq deem them relevant, and future successes may depend on clearly delineated concepts relating to the broad scope of capabilities that PRTs bring to the units in a short period of time. These factors are predictable, and if planned and addressed in joint doctrine, a more seamless transition to operations may take place during the training.
In order to increase legitimacy and maximize effectiveness, doctrine should acknowledge the host nation development strategy as the source document for planning. For example, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) outlines how the nation perceives itself and establishes a "roadmap" of prioritized goals for national development.
Chapter two of the ANDS directly addresses planning issues and priorities pertinent to the employment of PRTs in Afghanistan. This extensive document discusses the consultation process for development on the national, sub-national, international, and private sector levels. From this consultation, a detailed analysis of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan was conducted and Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) were created. The planning process analyzed government policy formation, prioritization, sequencing and needs-related resource allocation based on the varying needs of the 34 provinces. The factors considered in each province included agriculture, security, education, governance, health, the private sector, roads, infrastructure (energy and water), and social protection.
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Use and understanding of this document is critical for PRTs operating in Afghanistan.
The ANDS directly addresses the concerns of the people with these PDPs and projects a clear vision for their future. PRT planning, training, and preparing for the mission in Afghanistan is sufficiently enhanced as a direct result of the ANDS. However, doctrine should not only identify a national development strategy for effective planning, it should also incorporate inputs from civilian humanitarian organizations into PRT planning. Without security, the ability for a team to devote time, manpower and assistance to reconstruction is diminished. Without security, the NGO mission itself is at risk.
Defining the civil-military relationship serves to create an effective team and delineating joint doctrine for the "team building" aspect of operations will only enhance these CM relationships. As PRT operations continue, these relationships become more refined. It is critical that this knowledge is captured through more than just lessons learned.
In the development of PRT joint doctrine, much of the information can be taken directly from JP-08, but there are specific characteristics of PRT operations that need more clarity and specificity as they pertain to the use of PRTs in stability and reconstruction operations.
The PRT focus of effort is geared toward the development of a stable and secure environment. 23 Reconstruction not only has the ability to increase stability, it also serves to empower the host nation's population by giving them a direct "buy-in" to both the physical and social rebuilding of their society. A greater gain exists when a project builds more than a physical structure. The technical expertise and manpower experience gained, while building a bridge for example, has enduring effects for society. When capable PRTs accomplish these seemingly minor projects, these enduring effects further manifest themselves in the increased legitimacy and effectiveness of the governments of the host nation. 
POSSIBLE FOUNDATIONS FOR PRT DOCTRINE
Although PRT doctrine is lacking, there are three PRT specific manuals accompanied by volumes of lessons learned and best practices which have been gathered over the last five years. From these sources alone, a definitive Joint Doctrine can be developed. Currently, the best guidance provided to PRT commanders exists within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Handbook, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
PRTs in Iraq, and the CALL's PRT Playbook.
The PRT Handbook is currently the primary document that guides PRTs in their operations in Afghanistan and explains aspects of structure that is not covered in either of the other two manuals. The opening pages of the manual clarify in great detail what a PRT is and is not. It also highlights that the function of a PRT is analogous to "scaffolding;" an interim structure designed to help build the capacity of the government to govern and deliver essential public services, such as security, law and order, justice, health care, education, development and so on. 24 The ISAF mandate is presented upfront followed by the ISAF PRT mission statement which has been incorporated into the ISAF Operational Plan: sources has the capacity to transcend current operations and provide a solid foundation for generations to build on.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In researching this paper, it was determined that there exists a need for a single source of joint doctrine from which PRTs will benefit in planning, training, preparing and executing.
The last several years' experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the future operational Training continues to evolve with time, but significant shortfalls need to be addressed in doctrine to improve the process and enhance continuity of effort. Planning for PRT operations should be guided by the host nation development strategy and published doctrine must highlight this document as the primary source for planning, funding and allocation of resources.
Civil-military relationships are critical to the success of PRTs and information from existing sources of joint doctrine must be used to develop PRT doctrine. Specifically, JP 3-08 should be used as the basis for defining the PRT civil-military relationship.
Doctrinal development should draw from the information that already exists and the ISAF PRT Handbook and CALL's PRT Playbook should be the primary references for developing joint doctrine. These are excellent resources that are based on extensive experience and the Playbook is already written in a non-nation specific format following a doctrinal outline. Lessons learned and best practices from these manuals must also be incorporated in this doctrine to ensure that teams are trained adequately and efficiently for the mission.
Interagency involvement is critical to the development, training, planning, resourcing, and execution of PRT operations; therefore, doctrinal development should be staffed by interagency personnel as well as those in each branch of the armed services to ensure its effectiveness and enable solid partnership for future PRT operations.
COUNTER ARGUMENT
Some believe that it is not even possible to draw general conclusions from PRT operations to develop doctrine due to lack of strategic overview, agreed measures of effectiveness, and guidelines for civil-military relations as well as a proliferation of national sponsors, inconsistent models, and divergent operating environments. 29 Problems associated with funding sources, lack of unity with interagency partnerships, and in limitations on Rules of Engagement cooperating with our international partners create additional issues that further complicate the PRT mission. 30 Additionally, some argue that the current dynamic environment does not permit standardization at this point. They argue that flexibility is a PRT's greatest strength and that the conditions on the ground dictate that each PRT conduct operations with varying strategies to enable maximum effect.
These critiques are valid, but the points mentioned are issues that, as discussed in this paper, doctrine can address. Strategic overview needs to be reflected by the national development strategy; and coordination and partnership relations must be critically evaluated and incorporated into doctrine. The PRT mission is highly defined at this point and though measures of effectiveness may not be empirical in nature, success has been acknowledged and the PRT model has been established. Flexibility is a critical characteristic of PRT functionality, but doctrine need not detract from that. The FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency manual stands as an excellent example of doctrine that maintains flexibility and does not detract from a commander's ability to execute the mission. 
